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NOTES 
INFORMATION FAMINE, DUE PROCESS, AND THE 
REVISED CLASS ACTION RULE: WHEN 
SHOULD COURTS PROVIDE A SECOND 
OPPORTUNITY TO OPT OUT? 
Jeannette Cox>" 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine your friend Alice, a young mother, comes to you for ad­
vice. Her baby has severe birth defects, which likely resulted from the 
morning sickness drug Alice took when she was pregnant. Alice has 
incurred tremendous hospital bills for her child and is afraid she will 
not have enough money to pay for the additional surgeries her child 
will need in the future. After looking over the documents she recently 
received, you tell her she has a fast-approaching deadline to decide 
whether to commit herself to accepting a settlement from the com­
pany that manufactured the morning sickness drug. Understandably, 
Alice wants to know how much she would receive under the settle­
ment and is frustrated because the documents she received do not 
give her this information. To her great astonishment, you explain 
that the settlement does not yet exist and there is no way to predict 
how much the settlement might ultimately provide her. Anticipating 
her next question, you then tell her that she will not be able to learn 
the settlement's terms before the deadline for accepting or rejecting 
them. In fact, you know the attorney who represents her has barely 
begun negotiations with the pharmaceutical company. 
What you are explaining to Alice is that her claim against the 
pharmaceutical company has become part of a traditional class action 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3). The class action al-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2005; B.A., Hanover
College, 2001. Special thanks to Professor Jay Tidmarsh, Notre Dame Law School, 
who provided invaluable suggestions regarding this note topic. 
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lows a court to deal with the large number of similar claims against 
the pharmaceutical company in a single lawsuit that will more than 
likely result in a court-approved settlement. If Alice stays in the class 
action, her claim will be conclusively decided by the class action and 
she will-hopefully-receive a check from the pharmaceutical com­
pany. Alice also has the option to exclude herself from the class, or 
"opt out," if she thinks she can obtain a more favorable settlement or 
judgment by bringing an individual lawsuit. The catch is that Alice 
must decide, right now, whether to bind herself to accept the settle­
ment that the class action will ultimately yield or to opt out and go it 
alone. 1 If she stays in the class action, settlement negotiations will be 
entirely out of her hands. She will have no authority to reject pro­
posed settlements and will simply receive whatever remedy the class 
settlement provides. If she feels the settlement is unfair, her recourse 
will be to become an objector and attempt to persuade the court to 
withhold its approval of the settlement. Alternatively, she may entreat 
class counsel to renegotiate with the defendant. Neither avenue of 
protest is likely to be successful. 2 So, Alice must choose today whether 
she will opt out of the settlement or accept whatever amount the class 
action ultimately provides. 
With a lawyer's help, Alice can roughly estimate how much she 
could recover in an individual lawsuit, but this information is not suffi­
cient to make an informed opt-out decision because she cannot know 
the value of the class settlement. The class action might be a better 
option or it might be much worse. Either way, Alice is stuck. Her 
choice is a painful real life parallel to the dilemma often posed to 
game show contestants: whether to accept a prize they have seen or 
reject it in favor of the unknown prize behind door number two. For 
Alice, the choice is not simply a gamble for the greater of two wind­
falls. Rather, her gamble is to pick the avenue that will come closest 
to covering her debt to the hospital and her child's future surgeries. 
1 Because Rule 23(b) (3) requires that class members receive notice and an op­
portunity for exclusion "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an ac­
tion brought as a class action," opt-out deadlines often expire before claimholders 
possess enough information about the value of their claims to make an informed 
decision about whether to opt out. FED. R. CN. P. 23(c)(l); see Report of the Judicial 
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 215 F.R.D. 158, 189 
(2003) [hereinafter 2003 Report of Rules Committee]. 
2 As at least one court has acknowledged, the ability to appear to contest a settle­
ment often is insufficient to protect a person's property interest in her cause of ac­
tion. See Colt Indus. S'holder Litig. v. Colt Indus. Inc., 566 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (N.Y. 
1991) ("Despite the fact that Merritt had notice of the action and could have chosen 
to appear to contest the settlement, we do not believe that this was sufficient to pro­
tect Merritt's property interest in its cause of action."). 
2004] THE REVISED CLASS ACTION RULE 379 
If she does not opt out of the class action, she commits herself to 
accepting whatever money the class settlement provides and forgoes 
her opportunity to pursue an individual lawsuit. 
This Note contends that, in appropriate circumstances, judges 
overseeing class litigation should exercise their discretion to provide 
class members like Alice a second chance to opt out at the time when 
settlement terms are known. Such an opportunity comports with the 
plaintiffs traditional due process right to exert control over her claim 
and simultaneously recognizes the need to efficiently resolve large 
numbers of similar claims. Judges should provide a second opt-out 
opportunity when two factors are present: (1) when class members did 
not have sufficient information to make an informed choice by the 
opt-out deadline and (2) when a significant number of the claims 
would be economically viable in individual litigation. When both of 
these factors are present, a class member's interest in controlling her 
claim will normally outweigh the efficiency gains that might be 
achieved by denying class members a second opportunity to opt out. 
I. THE 2003 REVISION TO RULE 23
In December 2003, Congress approved several revis10ns to the 
federal class action rule. Among these revisions was a new provision 
that gave courts discretionary authority to direct a second opt-out op­
portunity when the parties reach settlement terms. 3 The added text 
provides: "In an action previously certified as a class action under Rule 
23(b) (3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it af­
fords a new opportunity to request exclusion to individual class mem­
bers who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not 
do so."4 
As the Federal Rules Advisory Committee explains, at a "basic 
level, the second opt-out opportunity gives class members the same 
opportunity to accept or reject a proposed settlement as persons enjoy 
in individual lawsuits."5 It also "introduces a measure of class-member 
self-determination and control that best harmonizes the class action 
with traditional litigation. "6 The Committee further explains: 
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3). Prior to the revision, severaljudges had already ap­
proved settlements requiring a second opt-out opportunity. See, e.g., In re Silicone 
Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, 
at *17 (N.D. Ala. Sept. l, 1994). 
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (3). 
5 2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note l, at 189-90. 
6 Id. at 190. 
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The presumption of consent that follows a failure to affirmatively 
opt out at the time of certification may lose its footing when circum­
stances have changed materially from the time when the class action 
is finally settled. In these cases, a second opt-out opportunity could 
relieve individuals from the unforeseen consequences of inaction or 
decisions made at the time of certification, when limited meaning­
ful information was available. 7 
Though the revision to Rule 23 makes clear that judges may di­
rect a second opt-out opportunity, it provides very little guidance as to 
what factors judges should consider to decide whether to do so. The 
Committee's comments simply state that "[t]here is no presumption 
that a second opt-out opportunity should be afforded" and the "ques­
tion is left entirely to the court's discretion."8 Perhaps the most signif­
icant guidance for courts is that the Committee considered but 
declined to adopt a revision that would have automatically provided a 
second opt-out opportunity.9 
As of September 2004, only two reported opinions have grappled 
with the question of when courts should provide a second opt-out op­
portunity pursuant to Rule 23's new opt-out provision. 10 Both de­
clined to provide the second opt-out opportunity. I I In one of those 
cases, the judge acknowledged that Rule 23 now allows courts to direct 
a second opt-out opportunity, but concluded that "[b] ecause I have 
approved these [s]ettlements as fair ... due process does not afford 
[c]lass members a second opportunity to opt out."I2 The judge's deci-
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 190. 
9 The Committee considered a revision that would have "direct[ed] that notice 
of the proposed settlement afford a new opportunity to elect exclusion unless the 
court finds good cause to deny the opportunity." Id. at 243. The Committee chose 
the discretionary version over the mandatory version amidst concern from members 
of the bar that an automatic second opt-out opportunity would impede settlement. 
See id. at 244 ("The common observation that the proposal may make it more difficult 
to reach a settlement agreement was divided between the view that the result will be 
better terms for class members and the view that good settlements may be defeated by 
a settlement opt-out opportunity."). 
10 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust, MDL No. 1426, 2004 WL 1068807, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. May 11, 2004); In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 
2d 503 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). Another court noted, without comment, that the class had 
enjoyed a second opportunity to opt out after the settlement terms were reached 
pursuant to the revised rule. In re AMF Bowling, No. 99 Civ. 3023(PKC), 2004 WL 
2049277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2004). 
11 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust, 2004 WL 1068807 at *3; In re Visa Check/ 
Mastennoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d at 518 n.18. 
12 See In re Visa Check/Mastennoney Antitrust Litig, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 518 n.18 (in­
ternal citations omitted). 
THE REVISED CLASS ACTION RULE 
sion may have been influenced by the Federal Rules Advisory Commit­
tee's suggestion that a second opt out can "provide[] an opportunity 
to gain information that the court can use in evaluating the proposed 
settlement."13 By focusing on this language, the judge could have 
concluded that informed opt out is necessary only when the court re­
viewing the class settlement suspects that the settlement is unfair. 
This Note, by contrast, contends that the purpose and need for 
informed opt out is much greater than simply to give judges informa­
tion about whether a proposed settlement is fair. If judges provide a 
second opt-out opportunity only when settlements are unfair, the revi­
sion adds nothing to the rule. Rule 23 already required judges to 
withhold their approval of unfair settlements. Informed opt out 
should be viewed not simply as a tool for courts to gather information 
about the fairness of a settlement, but as an important procedural 
safeguard that protects the right of claimholders to exert control over 
their claims. 
II. SUMMARY
The first part of this Note argues that the traditional conception 
of a plaintiffs right to exert control over her claim, the history of Rule 
23, and the emerging concern about "information famine" in the con­
text of class action settlements make an informed opt-out opportunity 
appropriate for most class actions involving damages claims. Though 
the current majority view is that due process does not require a sec­
ond opportunity to opt out, there is strong evidence that the drafters 
of Rule 23 believed that the purpose of the right to opt out was to 
enable potential class members to intelligently decide whether to stay 
in the class action. Furthermore, recent class action settlement cases 
from the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals evidence a growing 
concern that the inability of class members to intelligently exercise 
their right to opt out violates due process. Much like "future claim­
ant" class members who cannot evaluate the adequacy of a proposed 
settlement because they have not yet suffered injury, class members 
who must decide whether to opt out before settlement terms are 
known cannot evaluate whether their interests would be better served 
by opting out or remaining in the class. 
The second part of this Note proposes a two-factored test courts 
should employ to decide whether to exercise their discretionary au­
thority to provide an opportunity for class members to opt out after 
settlement terms are known. A court should first consider whether 
13 2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note 1, at 243. 
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the class members had insufficient information at the initial opt-out 
deadline to decide whether to stay in the class. In some situations, the 
settlement terms may have been known or readily estimable and thus 
the class members actually had sufficient information to make an in­
formed decision. Second, the court should consider whether the class 
action contains claims large enough to be economically viable in indi­
vidual litigation. The presence of such claims strongly argues for an 
opportunity for class members to make an informed opt-out decision. 
If both of these factors are present, the court should provide an in­
formed opt-out opportunity. The Note concludes by arguing that in­
formed opt out will not undermine the efficiency of (b) (3) class 
actions. 
III. STRIKING A BALANCE: THE FEDERAL CLASS ACTION RULE
The federal class action rule attempts to strike an acceptable bal­
ance between the rights of individual plaintiffs to exert control over 
the fate of their claims and the benefits of simultaneously resolving 
similar claims as a group. The current compromise between effi­
ciency and individual rights has yielded a system that guarantees class 
members different due process rights depending on the character of 
their claims. The rule designates three general types of class actions, 
each providing their members different levels of procedural protec­
tion. Class members like Alice, with individual damages claims, are 
entitled (1) to be adequately represented by a party with the same 
interests,14 (2) to receive notice that their claims will be conclusively 
determined by the class judgment or settlement, 15 and ( 3) to have an 
opportunity to opt out of the class action to bring an individual 
claim.16 These class actions fall under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b) (3) and are commonly called "(b) (3) class actions." They are 
also known as "opt-out" class actions because the other two types of 
class actions-certified under Rule 23(b) (1) and Rule 23(b) (2)-do 
not provide class members the right to opt out. 17 This is because the 
(b) (1) and (b) (2) provisions address special situations where there is
an overwhelming need to resolve all the class members' claims in one
lawsuit because a multiplicity of lawsuits would be harmful to the
class. 18 Class actions brought under Rule 23(b) (1) often involve situa-
14 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
15 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) (2). 
16 Id.
17 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
18 In (b)(l) and (b)(2) class actions, the benefits of simultaneous resolution of 
the entire class's claims outweigh the costs of limiting the rights of the individual class 
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tions in which a court must resolve all potential claims in one suit 
because there are insufficient funds to cover the claims. Class actions 
brought under Rule 23(b) (2) often involve injunctive relief where 
multiple suits would inflict inconsistent obligations on the defendant. 
This Note focuses on (b) (3) class actions. In (b) (3) class actions, Rule 
23 guarantees class members an opportunity to opt out, but does not 
require that the opt-out opportunity occur at a time when class mem­
bers have knowledge of the settlement terms. Generally, the opt-out 
deadline occurs shortly after class certification and before settlement 
terms are known. 19 
Since the creation of the (b) (3) class action, both practitioners 
and academics have vigorously debated the proper place of opt-out 
rights in class actions and whether class members should be able to 
opt out at all. The debate reflects a lack of consensus about how to 
balance each class member's interest in controlling her claim with the 
benefits of simultaneously resolving similar claims as a group. The 
long-standing ideals of the American adversarial system suggest that 
each class member with a traditional claim for money damages should 
pos�ess the same unilateral authority to control her claim as is pos­
sessed by individual plaintiffs. As Professor Roger Trangsrud notes, it 
seems unfair to provide a plaintiff injured by a morning sickness drug 
members. No opt-out rights are provided in class actions that involve limited fund 
situations, covered by Rule 23(b)(l), because "the only question is how to divide up 
the pie." In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 881 (6th Cir. 2000). All 
persons who have a right to a piece of the limited fund must be present in order to 
determine each claimholder's respective share. Opt-out rights are similarly denied in 
(b) (2) class actions because it is simply impracticable for some members of the plain­
tiff group to exempt themselves from the effect of the judgment. The (b) (2) class 
action is used for fashioning broad equitable remedies for a defendant's wrongdo­
ing-such as maintaining unconstitutional prison conditions or segregated schools­
that affect a large class of people. For this type of class action, there is a strong need 
"to avoid the possibility of conflicting judgments . . .  which would subject the defend­
ants to varying and possibly inconsistent obligations." Colt Indus. S'holder Litig. v. 
Colt Indus. Inc., 566 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (N.Y. 1991). Accordingly, class members are 
not given the option to opt out and pursue their claims individually because the "in­
terest in promoting individual control of litigation is outweighed by the importance 
of obtaining a single, binding determination." Id.
19 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS Ae­
TION DILEMMAS: PuRSuING PUBLIC GoALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 75 (2000) ("Such early 
notice means that at the time they learn of the case, potential class members cannot 
know how it will be resolved and whether, or how much, they might be recompensed 
for the alleged harms."); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH)§ 21.311 (2004) 
("Ordinarily, notice to class members should be given promptly after the certification 
order is issued."). 
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fewer procedural rights than a plaintiff injured in a car accident.20
From the plaintiff's point of view, her injuries and need for compensa­
tion are the same whether she was the only person harmed by the 
defendant's negligence or one among thousands. 
On the other side of the issue, the benefits of efficiently resolving 
large numbers of similar claims have led some commentators, such as 
Professor David Rosenberg, to recommend that the law should never 
let so-called "mass tort" victims exert independent control over their 
claims.21 Rosenberg proposes that Congress should transform (b) (3)
class actions into a vehicle for collective insurance whereby mass tort 
victims receive damages according to the relative severity of their inju­
ries rather than the relative strength of their claims.22 Accordingly,
Rosenberg argues that the law should not permit any one class mem­
ber to derail the efficiency of group settlement by opting out of the 
class. 23 He recommends not only that courts should deny class mem­
bers a second opportunity to opt out but also that Congress should 
amend Rule 23 to eliminate the initial opt-out opportunity guaran­
teed to (b)(3) class members.24 
Rosenberg's proposal, while certainly efficient from a macro-ltvel 
financial perspective, would abrogate the traditional right of a plain-
20 See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, U. ILL. L. REv. 
69, 87 (1989). 
Id. 
Our civil justice system owes a twelve-year-old girl born with foreshortened 
limbs after her mother took a prescribed morning sickness drug the same 
due process it owes a thirty-two-year-old man paralyzed when the brakes on 
his Chevrolet fail and his automobile slams into a tree. 
21 See David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Dpt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost 
Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19 [hereinafter Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt­
Out]; David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual justice lYy Collective 
Means, 62 IND. LJ. 561 (1987); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Expo­
sure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 851 (1984); David 
Rosenberg, Individual justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 
71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 210 (1996); David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The 
Only option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARv. L. REv. 831 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg, 
Mandatory-Litigation]; David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have 
and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARv. J. ON LEG IS. 393 (2000); David Rosenberg, Of End Games 
and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B. U. L. REv. 695 
(1989); David Rosenberg, The Regulatory Advantage of Class Action, in REGULATION 
THROUGH L ITIGATION 244 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002); Michael A. Perino, Class Action 
Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 
46 EMORY LJ. 85 (1997). 
22 Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation, supra note 21, at 834. 
23 Id. at 862. 
24 Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out, supra note 21, at 23. 
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tiff to exert control over her claim. It would effectively transfer that 
control, by governmental fiat, to class attorneys and defense counsel. 
The appropriate measure for whether particular compromises be­
tween efficiency and individual rights are acceptable is rooted not 
merely in concern for efficiency, but also in concern for the individual 
procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution.25 
A. Opt Out and Due Process
The Due Process Clause applies whenever the government threat­
ens a person with deprivation of their life, liberty, or property. 26 Class 
actions invoke the Due Process Clause because an individual's cause 
of action is itself a "protected property interest in its own right."27 
The Supreme Court has frequently acknowledged that a cause of ac­
tion is property, separate and apart from the property that makes up 
the subject of the litigation.28 Furthermore, the order of a court­
including an order approving a class settlement-is a government act 
that extinguishes a claimholder's property right in her cause of action. 
In the class action context, the termination of claims through settle­
ment is not merely a contractual exchange between the parties to the 
litigation but a governmentally-created procedure that extinguishes 
the claims of persons who-for most purposes-are not parties to the 
litigation. 
The fact that a class judgment or settlement can extinguish class 
members' claims is a departure from the general rule that no one is 
bound by a judgment to which he was not a party or a party's succes­
sor in interest. 29 In class actions, the actual plaintiff parties to the 
case-the class representatives-litigate the case and decide whether 
25 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) ("[O]ne might fairly say of 
the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in particular, that they were 
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing 
concern for efficiency.") (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)); cf. 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997) ("The argument is 
sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would pro­
vide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims of asbestos 
exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution."). 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
27 Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996). 
28 See id.; Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (noting that each 
class member possesses a constitutionally protected property interest in his or her 
claim); see also Colt Indus. S'holder Litig. v. Colt Indus. Inc., 566 N.E.2d 1160, 
1167-68 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that a class member's damage claim was a constitution­
ally protected right and that certain procedural requirements had to be met before 
the class member could be bound by a class settlement). 
29 Richards, 517 U.S. at 798 (citing Hansberryv. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)). 
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to accept or reject settlements. In reality, the class attorney often 
wields considerable power to make ultimate decisions and the class 
representatives only nominally participate.30 The vast majority of class 
members, who are not class representatives, have no authority to ac­
cept or reject settlements or to otherwise direct the actions of the class 
attorney. 31 
The vulnerable position of (b) (3) class members underlies Rule 
23's three protections for class members: adequate representation, no­
tice, and the right to opt out.32 The first two protections antedate the 
modern Rule 23, which was adopted in 1966. In 1940, the Supreme 
Court held that persons who are not parties to a lawsuit cannot be 
bound by an order resolving it unless one of the parties adequately 
represented them.33 Thus, in the class action context, class represent­
atives' interests must align with the interests of absent class members. 
In 1950, the Court held that due process also requires that persons 
who are not parties but whose rights will be conclusively determined 
by the group litigation receive notice.34 The Court explained that 
notice is "[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due pro­
cess in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality."35 
At the time Rule 23 was enacted, the Supreme Court had not 
addressed opt-out rights. In fact, the creation of opt-out rights in 1966 
represented a constriction of the procedural protections provided to 
class members. Prior to 1966, members of the type of class actions 
that roughly correspond to today's (b) (3) actions were not bound by a 
class judgment or settlement unless they affirmatively opted into the 
class. 36 The class action did not bind anyone who did not choose to 
enter into the class action and be bound by the judgment. Though 
the Committee that drafted Rule 23 settled on an "opt out" rather 
than an "opt in" rule,37 the Committee stressed that class members 
must receive notice of their right to opt out "to fulfill requirements of 
30 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at ll8. 
31 Id.
32 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 
33 Hansberry v. Lee, 3ll U.S. 32, 40 (1940). 
34 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
35 Id.
36 See, e.g.,John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to opt Out, 25 ARiz. L. REv. 3, 
14-15 (1984).
37 The Rules Advisory Committee felt a departure from the "opt-in" rule was nec­
essary because of their concern for promoting the mutuality of claim preclusion. The 
mutuality rule, important in 1966, has since been discarded. See Parklane Hosiery Co. 
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
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due process to which the class action procedure is of course subject."38 
There was "a strong feeling that the person who wants to go it alone, 
and to bring his individual action with his own lawyer, should be per­
mitted to do so."39 The Committee's notes emphasized that courts 
must ensure that (b) (3) class members have an opportunity to opt out 
and cannot waive this right under any circumstances.40 
Though the drafters of Rule 23 assumed that due process re­
quired an opportunity to opt out, the Supreme Court did not con­
sider the due process underpinnings for opt-out rights until Phillips 
Petroleum v. Shutts,41 nearly twenty years after the enactment of the 
modern Rule 23. In Shutts, the Court's precise holding was not that 
due process requires an opportunity to opt out for all (b) (3) class 
members, but that due process mandates an opt-out opportunity for 
out-of-state (b) (3) class members.42 In Shutts, almost all of the plain­
tiff class members lacked minimum contacts with Kansas, the forum 
state. 43 Applying the jurisdictional principles of International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington44 that courts normally apply to defendants, the Court
reasoned that plaintiff class members lacking minimum contacts with
the state could be bound only if they had consented to the court's
jurisdiction.45 The Court concluded that an out-of-state class member
who had no opportunity to exclude himself from the class could not
be said to have "consented" to the court's authority.46 Accordingly,
the Court held that, in addition to notice and adequate representa­
tion, "due process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be
provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by exe­
cuting and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form to
the court."47 
Despite Shutts's narrow holding, many courts have cited Shutts for 
the proposition that due process requires an opportunity to opt out 
for (b) (3) class actions, regardless of whether the class members have 
38 Notes of Rules Advisory Committee to 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 
69, 107 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Rules Advisory Notes]. 
39 Charles A. Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal and Appellate Proce-
dure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 338 (1964). 
40 1966 Rules Advisory Notes, supra note 38, at 106-07. 
41 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
42 Id. at 812. 
43 Id. at811.
44 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
45 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807-13. 
46 Id. at 812-13. 
47 Id. at 812. 
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minimum contacts to the forum.48 The Supreme Court bolstered this 
practice when it rearticulated Shutts's holding in Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp.,49 in language that focused more clearly on class members' prop­
erty rights in the context of class action settlements.50 The Court 
stated that "before an absent class member 's right of action [is] extin­
guishable due process require[s] 'at a minimum ... an absent plain­
tiff ... be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the 
class.' "51 Though the Court included a footnote explaining that 
Shutts only examined the procedural protections attendant on bind­
ing out-of-state class members,52 many commentators have concluded 
that due process provides all (b) (3) class members the right to opt out 
of a class action.53 
B. Informed Opt Out and Due Process
While the majority view is that due process mandates an opt-out 
opportunity for (b) (3) class members, the current consensus among 
the courts is that "due process does not afford class members a second 
opportunity to opt out."54 Most courts read Shutts to suggest that 
48 See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 221 F.3d 870, 881 (6th Cir. 2000) 
("[D]ue process requires that class members bringing particularized tort claims for 
money damages be provided an opportunity to opt-out of the class."); Feuerman v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 96 Civ. 0120, 1996 WL 648966, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 
1996) ("[M]inimum due process requirements are: adequate notice, an opportunity 
to appear, an opportunity to opt out, and adequate representation."); Williams v. 
Lane, 129 F.R.D. 636,641 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts explicitly 
held that due process required both notice and an opportunity to opt out before 
judgment may bind a known but absent member of a damage-seeking class."); see also 
Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 
80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1087 (1995) (noting that "[i]n Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts, the Supreme Court held that in class actions brought for money damages . . .  
due process requires that absent class members receive notice and the opportunity to 
opt out"). 
49 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
50 id. at 848-49 (1999) (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812). 
51 Id. 
52 id. at 848 n.24. 
53 See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 48, at 1087-88 (noting that "[i]n Phillips Petroleum 
Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court held that in class actions brought for money dam­
ages . . .  due process requires that absent class members receive notice and the oppor­
tunity to opt out"). 
54 In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F. Supp. 2d 503, 518 n.18 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003); see Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 635 (9th 
Cir. 1982) ("[W)e have found no authority of any kind suggesting that due process 
requires that members of a Rule 23 (b) (3) class be given a second chance to opt out. 
We think it does not."); In re Lloyd's Am. Trust Fund Litig., No. 96 Civ. 1262, 2002 WL 
31663577, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2002) ("If the proposed settlement is fair, ade-
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once an individual fails to opt out, she has "consented" to the court's 
jurisdiction and thus has forgone her single opportunity to escape the 
binding judgment ( or settlement) entered by the court. The Shutts 
idea that failure to opt out equals consent is, of course, fictional. Class 
members often do not have enough information by the opt-out dead­
line to "consent" to the class action. Even if sufficient information 
exists, some class members will not understand, read, or perhaps even 
receive the notice informing them of the class action and their right 
to opt out. 55 Even so, the Shutts holding requires only one chance to 
opt out; it does not require an opportunity to make an informed 
choice about whether to stay in the class. 
Notwithstanding the absence of case law directly supporting a sec­
ond opportunity to opt out, Rule 23's history demonstrates that the 
drafters designed the opt-out provision not simply to satisfy the re­
quirements of personal jurisdiction but to foster class members' abili­
ties to decide whether to remain in the class action or pursue 
individual litigation.56 Paul Carrington and Derek Apanovitch assert 
that "it was clearly understood in 1966 that no class member could 
possibly be bound to a judgment who was not given actual notice of 
the proceeding and in a position to exercise intelligently the choice to 
opt out."57 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated that due process 
procedures must be implemented in a manner calculated to accom­
plish their purpose. For example, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 
& Trust Co.,58 the Court held that "when notice is a person's due, 
process which is a mere gesture is not due process" and that the "con-
quate and reasonable, due process does not afford Class Members a second opportu­
nity to opt out."). 
55 See 2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note 1, at 190. 
Id. 
The presumption of consent that follows a failure to affirmatively opt out at 
the time of certification may lose its footing when circumstances have 
changed materially from the time when the class action is finally settled. In 
these cases, a second opt-out opportunity could relieve individuals from the 
unforeseen consequences of inaction or decisions made at the time of certi­
fication, when limited meaningful information was available. 
56 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
57 Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of Judicial 
Rulemaking: The Invalidity of ProjJosed Ru'-e 23(b)(4), 39 ARiz. L. REv. 461, 489 (1997) 
( emphasis added) ( citing John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of Proposed Ru'-e 23 
on Class Actions, in 2 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, WORKING 
PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
CIVIL Ru LE 23, at 264, 269 ( 1997)). 
58 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
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stitutional validity" of a particular manner of notifying claim holders 
should be judged by whether it was "reasonably certain to inform 
those affected."59 Thus, the measure of whether notice complies with 
due process is whether the manner in which the notice requirement is 
carried out comports with the purpose of the notice requirement. 
Similarly, in the context of the right to a hearing in individual litiga­
tion, the Court has held that due process requires not only the oppor­
tunity to be heard, but an "opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner.' "60 The Court has acknowledged 
that a hearing which takes place at an inappropriate time may be "an 
exercise in futility" that violates due process.61 
The prevailing practice under Rule 23-which provides a single 
opportunity to opt out at a time when class members cannot intelli­
gently decide whether to do so-is analogous to a notice procedure 
that does not actually attempt to inform the persons affected and to a 
hearing set too early or too late to preserve a person's rights. The due 
process rights to potentially effective notice and hearings suggest that 
opt-out opportunities should be structured in a way that gives 
claimholders the ability to meaningfully exercise their right to opt 
out. 
Further support for an informed opt-out rule can be found in 
recent opinions involving the subset of class actions in which attorneys 
reach a settlement prior to filing the lawsuit. Several courts have held 
that due process requires that class notices in settlement-only class ac­
tions not only inform class members of their right to opt out, but also 
describe the settlement terms so class members can make informed 
decisions.62 The Fifth Circuit held that a settlement-only class action 
5 9  Id. at 315. The Court held that notice by publication did not satisfy due pro­
cess when the names and addresses of the interested persons were known. Id. at 
318-2 0.
60 City of Los Angeles v. David, 5 38 U.S. 715, 717 (2 003); see Richards v. Jefferson
County, 5 17 U.S. 793, 804 (1996) ("[The state] may not deprive a person of all ex­
isting remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the State has no power to de­
stroy, unless there is , or was, afforded to him some real opportunity to protect it.") 
(citation omitted); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 5 5, 72 (1979) ("The Fourteenth Amend­
ment re quires 'an opportunity ... granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.'") ( citations omitted). 
61 Barry, 443 U.S. at 74 (quoting Barchi v. Sarafan, 436 F. Supp. 775, 782 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); see Irene Sharf & Christine Hess, Comment, What Process Is Due? Un­
accompanied Minors' Rights to Deportation Hearings, 1988 DuKE LJ. 114, 116 ("[T]he 
exercise of a right that was created to protect constitutional entitlements ... must be 
feasible.") ( citing Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 102 3, 1039 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
62 See, e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir. 
1995); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 5 5 2  F.2d 1088, 1103-05 (5th Cir. 
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notice must not only meet Rule 23's formal requirement that the no­
tice take the best form "practicable under the circumstances,"63 but 
"must also contain information reasonably necessary to make a deci­
sion to remain a class member and be bound by the final judgment or 
opt out of the action."64 The court went on to specify that the notice 
"muit contain information that a reasonable person would consider to 
be material in making an informed, intelligent decision of whether to 
opt out or remain a member of the class and be bound by the final 
judgment."65 The court reasoned that "[i]f the initial class notice 
does not include information of the proposed settlement ... an ab­
sentee class member lacks an essential factor in the decisionmaking 
equation."66 The Second Circuit has more explicitly stated that 
"[d]ue process requires that the notice to class members fairly apprise 
the . . .  members of the class of the terms of the proposed settle­
ment and of the options that are open to them."67 
The Fifth and Second Circuits' concern for the ability of class 
members to know the settlement's terms echoes Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., in which the Supreme Court held that due 
process requires that a claimholder receive notice of a pending action 
in which her rights will be conclusively determined.68 In Mullane, the 
Court noted that the right to be heard-"[t]he fundamental requisite 
of due process"-"has little reality or worth unless one is informed 
1977); Grunin v. Int'! House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 122 (8th Cir. 1975); see also 
32B AM.juR. 2d Federal Courts§ 2073 (1996). 
Id. 
The ... requirement that absentee class members be given the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances demands that the class members re­
ceive notice of a proposed settlement, since the members' rights are clearly 
affected by the settlement, and without notice of it, the absentee class mem­
ber lacks an essential factor affecting the decision whether to remain a mem­
ber of the class. 
63 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (amended 2003). The current rule, changed by the 
2003 revisions, provides more detailed requirements for the class notice. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(c)(2).
64 In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d at 1105 (citations omitted).
65 Id.
66 Id. 
67 Maywalt, 67 F.3d at 1079. On this principle, some courts have required parties
to delay notifying the class until the settlement is sufficiently well-defined to allow 
class members to make an informed choice about whether to opt out. For example, 
one court concluded that" [a] full description of [the settlement terms] will need to 
be determined .. . prior to any opt-out notices being sent to class members [because] 
in the absence of such information, no informed opt-out decision could be made." In 
re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 356 (N. D. Ohio 2001). 
68 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
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that the matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear 
or default, acquiesce or contest."69 
The Fifth and Second Circuits' insistence that settlement-only 
class members know the settlement's terms suggests there is a due pro­
cess problem whenever class members do not know the terms of the 
class settlement before the opt-out period expires.70 If it is a due,pro­
cess violation for settlement-only class members to have to decide 
whether to opt out v.rithout knowing the terms of the settlement, it is 
also a due process violation to put traditional class action members in 
the same position. There is no principled reason to deny traditional 
class action members the right to informed choice that is guaranteed 
to their counterparts in settlement-only class actions. 
Courts have also noted that information famine violates due pro­
cess in the context of settlements that purport to bind future claim­
ants, such as persons who have been exposed to a cancer-causing 
substance and have an indeterminate risk of future injury. In Amchem 
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 71 the Supreme Court suggested that the in­
ability of future claimants to predict the value of their potential future 
claims in comparison with the terms of a known settlement might vio­
late due process.72 The Amchem class action-which involved asbes­
tos-had been certified for settlement only, so class members knew 
the terms of the settlement before the opt-out deadline.73 However, 
the class members who had not yet developed injuries as a result of 
their exposure to asbestos could not predict the value of their claims. 
The effects of asbestos can be latent for more than forty years and 
while some exposed persons will develop serious diseases, some will 
not.74 The Court agreed with the Third Circuit's conclusion that the 
class members with future claims "lack[ed] adequate information to 
properly evaluate whether to opt out of the settlement."75 
69 Id. (emphasis added). 
70 Informed opt out would "provide the same ability to opt out with knowledge of 
the settlement terms that is enjoyed by members of the many (b) (3) classes that are 
considered for certification-and thus afford a right to request exclusion-after a 
settlement has been reached." 2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note 1, at 189. 
71 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
72 Id. at 628. 
73 Id. at 597. 
74 Id. at 598. 
75 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 633 (3d Cir. 1996); see Amchem,
521 U.S. at 611 (recognizing "the unfairness of binding exposure-only plaintiffs who 
might . . .  lack sufficient information about their exposure to make a reasoned deci­
sion whether to stay in or opt out" and criticizing the settlement for providing only 
very limited opportunities for future claimants to exit the class when they developed 
injuries). 
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The Court explained that the "serious fairness concerns"76 identi­
fied by the Third Circuit were typified by class member Margaret 
Balonis, the widow of a man who was symptom-free at the time the 
opt-out period expired but developed a fatal asbestos-related disease a 
few months thereafter. 77 The Court noted that future claimants like
Mrs. Balonis "may not have the information or foresight needed to 
decide, intelligently" whether to opt out of the class settlement. 78 The
Third Circuit had acknowledged that the "powerful" due process ar­
guments79 presented in Amchem suggest that Congress should amend 
Rule 23 to provide additional opt-out rights for future claimants.80
The information famine that confronts class members in a tradi­
tional class action is analogous to the predicament of future claimants. 
Both future claimants and members of traditional class actions must 
choose between accepting a settlement and preserving their individ­
ual claim without knowing the value of one of the choices. At the 
time the Amchem future claimants had to decide whether to opt out, 
they knew the value of the settlement but did not know the value of 
their claims. Traditional class members, at the time they must decide 
whether to opt out, probably have some idea of the value of their 
claims, but they do not know the value of the settlement. It is telling 
that the settling parties in Amchem defended the unfair effects of their 
settlement on future claimants by arguing that "the class members 
[with future claims], having the terms of the settlement before them, 
were in a better position to exercise a choice than the usual notice 
recipient who has no idea how the case will come out."81
The emerging concern about information famine in Amchem and 
the Fifth and Second Circuits' notice cases suggests that no (b) (3) 
class member should have to decide whether to accept a settlement 
76 Georgi,ne, 83 F.3d at 634. 
77 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 605 n.7. 
78 Id. at 628; see also Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 572 (E.D. Tex. 
1974) (noting that persons "might neglect to 'opt-out' of the class, and then discover 
some years in the future that they have contracted asbestosis, lung cancer or other 
pulmonary disease"). 
79 Georgi,ne, 83 F.3d at 622. 
80 See id. at 634-35 (suggesting that the Rules Committee or Congress could ad­
dress due process problems implicated by future claims by providing for "opt-in clas­
ses" or "classes with greater opt-out rights"). Ultimately, however, the Third Circuit 
and the Supreme Court couched their disapproval of the Amchem settlement not in 
terms of opt-out rights, but in terms of improper class certification-the class did not 
meet Rule 23's requirements that absent class members be adequately represented by 
class representatives and that common issues predominate over any questions affect­
ing only individual members. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625; Georgi,ne, 83 F.3d at 617. 
81 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629. 
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agreement at a time when she has no idea what the terms of that set­
tlement will be. Class members should have the ability to meaning­
fully exercise their right to opt out. Plaintiffs in one-on-one litigation 
have an absolute right to evaluate and reject settlement terms.82 Ac­
cording to the Second and Fifth Circuits, plaintiffs in settlement-only 
class actions also have the right to know settlement terms before de­
ciding whether to opt out of a class action. Class members in tradi­
tional (b) (3) class actions, who often have claims identical to plaintiffs 
in settlement-only class actions and one-on-one litigation, should also 
have the ability to make an informed choice. 
C. When Should Courts Provide a Second Opportunity to Opt Out?
The argument for informed opt out, outlined above, emphasizes 
the need for class members to intelligently exercise their right to de­
cide whether to remain in the class. Informed opt out is necessary to 
achieve the purpose of opt-out rights and to harmonize the rights pro­
vided to class action members with the rights provided to plaintiffs in 
82 In fact, the public policy favoring an individual plaintiff's right to evaluate and 
reject settlement terms is so strong that courts in most states will invalidate a client's 
attempt to give up this right. See Ariz. Ethics Op. 94-03 (1994) (holding that a re­
tainer agreement violated the professional rules of conduct when it gave the lawyer 
broad power to abandon the client's case or settle it without the client's consent); In
re Grievance Proceeding, 171 F. Supp. 2d 81 (D. Conn. 2001) (holding that a written 
fee agreement delegating all settlement authority to a lawyer violated Rule of Profes­
sional Conduct l.2(a)); In re Lansky, 678 N.E.2d 1114 (Ind. 1997) (holding that a fee 
agreement in which a client gave up her right to determine whether to accept a settle­
ment offer violated Rule of Professional Conduct l.2(a)). Even agreements that 
merely place economic pressure on the client to accept the attorney-approved settle­
ment terms, rather than completely eliminate her choice, are invalid. See Conn. In­
formal Ethics Op. 99-18 (1999) (holding that a contingent-fee agreement may not 
include a clause requiring the client to pay the lawyer at an hourly rate if the client 
rejects a settlement offer recommended by the lawyer and the defendant prevails, and 
further noting that the client has the right to decide whether to accept a settlement 
and that economic pressure limiting that right violates Rule of Professional Conduct 
l.2(a)).
If the public policy favoring a client's right to evaluate settlement terms is so 
strong that the courts will invalidate a client's attempt to contract around it, it seems 
irrational to compel class action litigants to abdicate their authority to make settle­
ment decisions. If an individual claimholder cannot contract to allow her trusted 
individual attorney to make settlement decisions for her, a claimholder swept into 
class action litigation should not be forced to surrender her decision-making author­
ity to an attorney whom she most likely has never met. The class action claimholder, 
even more than the individual claimholder, cannot predict, months or years before 
settlement is reached, whether the attorney who represents her will deliver acceptable 
settlement terms. She should not be forced to choose whether to accept a settlement 
payout before knowing what the contours of that settlement will be. 
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individual litigation. As the above argument acknowledges, however, 
determining the specific requirements of due process in particular sit­
uations involves balancing individual rights with the judicial system's 
competing interest in efficiently resolving large numbers of similar 
claims.83 In most situations, the class members' rights to control their 
claims will outweigh the costs of a second opt-out opportunity. How­
ever, there may be situations in which the class members' interests in 
controlling their claims are so small that the costs of a second oppor­
tunity to opt out will outweigh its benefits. The next two sections out­
line two factors courts should consider to determine, on a case by case 
basis, whether to provide a second opt-out opportunity. 
1. The Inadequacy of Information at the Initial Opt-Out Deadline
Should Weigh in Favor of Providing a Second Opportunity
to Opt Out
The first factor a court should consider is whether the class mem­
bers had insufficient information at the initial opt-out deadline to de­
cide whether to stay in the class. In some situations, the class 
members may know the settlement terms prior to the opt-out deadline 
and thus not need a second chance to make an informed decision. 
Accordingly, a second opt-out opportunity is unnecessary in set­
tlement-only class actions in which plaintiff and defense counsel have 
arrived at settlement terms before going to court.84 In these situa­
tions, one opt-out opportunity is sufficient because the initial notice 
sent to class members will contain the terms of the settlement. At the 
time of the opt-out deadline, a class member can simply estimate how 
much he or she would recover in an individual lawsuit and compare 
that amount with the amount he or she would receive under the 
settlement. 
Even though settlement-only class action notices often do not 
specify the precise amount each class member will receive but instead 
provide an estimate of settlement terms, the information contained 
within the estimate will usually be sufficient to enable the class mem­
bers to make a reasonably informed decision. Though it would be 
83 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (explaining that "due pro­
cess is flexible" and that the procedural protections mandated by due process vary 
depending on the nature of the governmental and private interests involved). 
84 See 2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note 1, at 190. 
Id. 
The proposal will only make a difference in cases in which the class is certi­
fied and the initial opt-out period expires before a settlement agreement is 
reached. It is irrelevant in those cases in which a settlement agreement is 
submitted to the court simultaneously with a request that a class be certified. 
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hard to imagine a plaintiff in individual litigation binding herself to a 
settlement when she knows only a rough approximation of the settle­
ment's value, the benefits of efficient group settlement probably out­
weigh this relatively small detriment to individual class members. A 
court should provide a second opportunity to opt out, however, if the 
court ultimately finds a significant disparity between the estimated 
and final settlement terms. 
2. The Presence of Claims that Would Be Viable in Individual
Litigation Should Weigh in Favor of Providing a Second
Opportunity to Opt Out
The second factor a court should consider when deciding
whether to provide a second opportunity to opt out is the size of the 
individual class members' claims. If no class members could feasibly 
bring their claims in individual litigation, it may be reasonable for a 
court to deny a second opt-out opportunity.85 If, however, a signifi­
cant number of the class members' claims would be economically via­
ble in individual litigation, the class members should have the 
opportunity to make an informed decision about whether to stay in 
the class or litigate their claims individually. 
A court should provide an informed opt-out opportunity in class 
actions with high-value claims not only because persons with high­
value claims have more to lose but also because they are more likely to 
be harmed by the class action mechanism.86 This is because plaintiff 
class counsel has an incentive to undercut the interests of class mem­
bers who hold high value claims. If class counsel acts in his rational 
self-interest, he will seek to settle the class action to achieve the great­
est possible personal profit in the shortest amount of time.87 Though 
settlements involving outright collusion between class counsel and the 
85 Courts widely acknowledge that the rationale for the class action procedure is 
most compelling when the cost for each claimholder to bring an individual lawsuit 
would exceed her potential recovery. In fact, several courts have hinted that the supe­
riority requirement for class certification may require the presence of negative-value 
claims. See Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 211 F.3d 1228, 1241 n.21 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 420 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Castano v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 
51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995). 
86 See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class 
Action, 103 CoLUM. L. REv. 149, 162 (2003) (noting that persons with strong claims 
are most at risk from the monopoly power wielded by class counsel). 
87 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
CoLUM. L. REv. 669, 685 (1986). 
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defendant may be rare,88 even the most well-intentioned class attorney 
can easily bow to defendant pressure to push the recovery of high­
value claimants toward the average.89 Furthermore, the courts­
which must approve class settlements as fair-often lack adequate in­
formation to probe settlement agreements for potential fairness con­
cerns not brought to their attention by class counsel.90 Even if the 
court has adequate information, there will often be a sizable gap be­
tween the settlement a court will approve and the settlement an indi­
vidual claimholder would voluntarily accept. 
As Richard Nagareda has suggested, informed opt out would be 
an effective check on the tendency of class counsel to accept settle­
ment terms unfavorable to high value claimholders. Nagareda ex­
plains that, from the perspective of class counsel, the exit of a class 
member corresponds to the entry of a competing attorney who will 
take a piece of the pie formerly held intact by class counsel's represen­
tation of all the claimants in the class.91 Opt out-or merely the 
threat of opt out-serves to discipline class counsel to work harder to 
negotiate a settlement acceptable to the members of the class who 
have the most to lose. The same threat motivates defendants to com­
promise so they can achieve global peace. Accordingly, when a class 
contains members who could litigate their claims on their own, the 
court should provide class members the opportunity to intelligently 
decide whether to remain in the class. 
By contrast, a judge could reasonably deny a second opt-out op­
portunity to a class in which none of the members could feasibly bring 
their claims in individual litigation. Though a holder of a nominal 
claim possesses a property interest just like the holder of a high-value 
claim, there is a reasonable argument that the efficiency of resolving a 
large number of claims at once outweighs the low-value claimholder's 
interest in intelligently exerting control over her claim. The informa­
tion famine created by a single opt-out procedure has far less adverse 
impact on persons holding claims they would never bring in individ-
88 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 93-99 (explaining that while conventional 
wisdom is that collusion between class attorneys and defendants is a serious problem, 
there has been very little research attempting to quantify the problem). 
89 See Nagareda, supra note 86, at 167 (noting that high value claimholders are 
most at risk because "[t]he greater the variance in claim value, the more fervent the 
effort at variance reduction through the embrace of a class settlement that dampens 
the prospect for variance at the high end of the damage scale and pushes payouts 
toward the average"). 
90 See id. at 169 (noting that "courts, at best, are awkwardly suited for this role, for 
it requires them to act contrary to their self-interest in docket clearance"). 
91 See id. at 170. 
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ual litigation. Arguably, these claimholders do not need to know the 
terms of the settlement in order to decide intelligently whether to stay 
in the class or opt out. They know that they would not bring their 
claims in individual litigation and accordingly can easily realize that 
any amount of recovery the class action provides would be larger than 
nothing, the amount they would otherwise receive. Furthermore, the 
low-value claimholder who wishes to litigate her claim in an individual 
lawsuit for non-economic reasons92 will have all the information she 
needs to decide whether to do so by the normal opt-out deadline. 
Drawing on general legal billing practices, a court should be able 
to distinguish between claims that feasibly could be brought in indi­
vidual litigation and those that could not. Prevailing norms should 
indicate which claims are economically viable. If the claimholder 
could not retain an attorney on a contingent-fee basis and the lodestar 
fees that would be necessary to litigate the claim would exceed the 
likely recovery, the claim is not economically viable. 
D. Informed Opt Out Will Not Significantly Affect the Efficiency of
Class Settlement 
The primary fear associated with providing class members a sec­
ond opportunity to opt out is that the availability of such an opportu­
nity would impede settlement. In the context of explaining the 2003 
revisions to Rule 23, the Rules Advisory Committee indicated that it 
chose to recommend a discretionary rather than automatic second 
opt-out opportunity because of the large number of comments it re­
ceived reflecting the widely-held assumption that an informed opt-out 
rule would impede settlement. The Committee reported that many 
commentators shared "the view that good settlements may be de­
feated by a settlement opt-out opportunity."93 
The widespread concern about the defeat of "good settlements" 
embodies a general feeling that a few members of a class should not 
be permitted to "spoil" the settlement by exiting the class after settle­
ment terms are reached.94 It is not at all clear, however, that in-
92 Non-economic reasons that might motivate a claimholder to litigate a non­
economically viable claim include the desire to litigate "for the principle of the thing" 
and to raise public awareness of the defendant's wrongdoing. 
93 2003 Report of Rules Committee, supra note 1, at 244. 
94 See, e.g., Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 639 (N.D. Cal. 1978) 
(stating that a few class members with high claims "should not .. . be allowed to play 
the role of spoilers" for the rest of the class); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class 
as Party and Client, 73 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 954-55 (1998) (suggesting that the 
interests of the class as a whole would "be severely undermined and potentially de­
stroyed if individual members could opt out at will"); Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the 
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formed opt out would actually pose a danger to "good settlements." 
In individual litigation, a "good settlement" would be one to which all 
the persons involved voluntarily give their consent after considering 
the value of the settlement terms vis-a-vis the strength of their claims. 
To the extent that class members would not choose to consent to the 
terms of a class settlement, it is difficult to claim that the settlement is 
a "good" one. The primary groups that express concern about the 
defeat of "good settlements" are defendants, defense attorneys, and 
class attorneys-the persons who stand to gain from settlements that 
provide class members less than they would achieve in individual 
litigation. 95 
Furthermore, providing class members the ability to make in­
formed choices about whether to exit the class would not work an 
injustice on the class members who choose to stay. Admittedly, the 
exit of some class members (most likely those with stronger claims) 
might reduce the compensation other class members would receive in 
the settlement if the defendant was willing to pay a premium for the 
ability to settle with all the claimholders at once.96 Though the loss of 
premium payment when some claimholders opt out is unfortunate 
from the perspective of class members who choose to stay in the class 
(most likely those with weaker claims), it is not unfair. The substan­
tive law dictates that many injured persons will not receive compensa­
tion through the legal system (because, for example, they have 
causation or statute of limitations problems) while others may recover 
in excess of their actual loss. 
As Richard Nagareda has noted, while the combination of strong 
and weak claims in a class action may work to increase the amount the 
defendant pays to holders of weak claims, weak claim holders have no 
"right" to the additional amount that they could not achieve on their 
own.97 This additional amount largely results from the cost savings 
associated with settling large numbers of claims at once and the assur-
Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REv. 571, 612 (1997) ("Because defend­
ants may refuse to settle unless they obtain a global settlement, the refusal of some 
class members to settle may in fact deny other class members the ability to settle their 
claims, requiring them instead to assume the risk of trial."). Some commentators 
have gone so far as to suggest that as a precondition to opt out, there should be a 
good cause hearing at which the court would balance the interest of the litigant in 
seeking to exit the class against those of the class members who would thereby be 
injured. See, e.g., American Bar Ass'n Section of Litig., Report and Recommendations of 
the Special Committee on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 202 (1986). 
95 HENSLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 93-99. 
96 In fact, defendants will likely protect themselves by conditioning settlement 
agreements on a maximum number of opt outs. 
97 Nagareda, supra note 86, at 217. 
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ance-if "global peace" is achieved-that the defendant will not have 
to defend against any more claims of the same type.98 If the potential 
cost-savings evaporate because persons with high-value claims opt out 
of the class, low-value claimholders have not lost anything to which 
they were previously entitled.99 In our current legal system, it would 
be unjust to short-circuit substantive tort law by forcing all class mem­
bers to remain in a class action. In the absence of a true limited-fund 
scenario, claimholders should not be forced to accept lower recov­
eries than they could recover in one-on-one litigation simply because 
many other people suffered a similar injury.100 
Furthermore, it is not inevitable that informed opt out would be 
less efficient than the current single opt-out procedure. Though 
many courts and commentators have assumed that informed opt out 
would result in a higher total number of persons exiting the class, they 
have developed this view by considering the issue at the time settle­
ment terms are reached. They have not considered the possibility that 
the information famine inherent in the current single opt-out proce­
dure may lead some class members to opt out of the class who would 
have chosen to stay in the class if they had the ability to know the 
settlement terms at the time of their decision. A risk-averse game 
show contestant may choose to settle for the prize he has seen rather 
than gamble on a concealed-potentially larger or smaller-prize. 101 
It is even more likely that an injured person with real financial need­
like your friend Alice, discussed supra102-will opt for the individual 
recovery she can estimate and, to some extent, control, rather than 
bind herself to accept an unknown class action settlement. The Fifth 
Circuit acknowledged this possibility in the context of a settlement­
only class action.103 It concluded that providing less than complete 
information about the settlement terms was inconsistent with the goal 
of having the class settlement dispose of as many claims as possible, 
noting that "[t]he binding scope of the present action would be di­
rectly diminished by that number of class members who decided to 
opt out of the action but who otherwise would have utilized the class 
action device if information of the proposed settlement had appeared 
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Trangsrud, supra note 20, at 87. 
101 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1 (noting the human tendency to 
prefer to "bear those ills we have / Than fly to others that we know not of'); see also 
the traditional Latin proverb "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." 
102 See supra pp. 377-79. 
103 See In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088, 1105-06 (5th Cir. 
1977). 
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[in the notice] ."104 Thus, it is possible that informed opt out may in
fact increase the number of claims settled because it will keep claim­
ants in the class for a longer period of time. Instead of hastily opting 
out at the commencement of the action, claimholders could wait to 
make an informed decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2003 revISions to the federal class action rule empower 
courts to cure the problem of information famine often faced by the 
members of (b) (3) class actions. The revisions, however, make exer­
cise of this power purely discretionary. This Note has argued that 
courts should liberally use their authority to provide class members 
the ability to make informed opt-out decisions. Courts should provide 
class members a second opportunity to opt out when two factors are 
present: when (1) the class members had inadequate information at 
the initial opt-out deadline and (2) it would be economically feasible 
for class members to pursue their claims in individual litigation. 
Though the current majority view is that due process does not 
require a second opportunity to opt out, recent cases evidence a grow­
ing concern that the information famine suffered by class members 
when they blindly exercise their single right to opt out violates due 
process. Much like class members who cannot evaluate the adequacy 
of a proposed settlement because they have not yet suffered injury, 
class members who must decide whether to opt out before the settle­
ment terms are known cannot evaluate whether their interests would 
be better served by opting out or remaining in the class. 
Even if due process does not require informed opt out, basic fair­
ness suggests that (b) (3) class members with economically viable 
claims should have the ability-guaranteed to plaintiffs in individual 
litigation and to many class members in settlement-only class ac­
tions-to make an informed decision about whether to accept a settle­
ment. Contrary to widely-held assumptions, informed opt out will not 
necessarily impede the efficiency of good class settlements. It will in­
stead ensure that class members are not forced to swallow settlement 
terms they would have never accepted voluntarily. Liberal use of Rule 
23's new informed opt-out provision will not only alleviate the predica­
ment faced by members of (b) (3) class actions, but will also give new 
life and legitimacy to Rule 23 (b) ( 3). 
104 Id. at 1106. 
